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The Theological Appearance of the Church of England:

An External View

BERNARD WILLIAMS

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My disqualifications for writing about this subject are many; I must start by declaring some. I am not a member of the Church of England, and thus may be suspected of being biassed against it, or at least lacking in sympathy with it. The fact that I am not a member of any other church, either, may do something to alleviate the first suspicion, but may, on the other hand, only tend to aggravate the second, since it may be thought that only Christians are likely to show much understanding in questions of Christian theology. To a certain extent, this must of course be admitted: a theology is not something that can just be "got up", or completely understood from the outside. Nevertheless, it surely cannot be that unbelief is a complete bar to discussion, if the Church is to speak, not only with itself, but with those outside—which is surely what the Church must hope to do. So I hope that some unpolemical remarks from someone outside will not necessarily and completely lack point.

Since I belong to no church, it will be seen that my reasons for unbelief do not consist merely of objections to Anglicanism, but are more general than that. It is not my aim here, however, to raise these general difficulties. I shall merely try to discuss some features of the Anglican position today, as I understand it. Here I shall make the last of my introductory apologies: that I have no doubt that I understand it very imperfectly. Perhaps some of the things I say will be merely misunderstandings. I do hope, though, that if they are misunderstandings, they are not merely personal misunderstandings, but misunderstandings shared with others outside the Church who take an interest in it. If so—and discussions I have had with others suggest that it is so—perhaps I can hope that even my mistakes will have some symptomatic kind of interest.

I have spoken of "the Anglican position". But one immediate and notorious difficulty is that of identifying *an* Anglican position at all. *Quot Anglicani, tot sententiae* would be an unfair exaggeration, but the despairing enquirer has been known to think it. The variation of Anglican opinion is a familiar, but not a trivial, difficulty. There

are those who do not find it a difficulty, but rather a recommendation, indicative of a wide freedom of conscience. It seems to me, however, that it undoubtedly is a difficulty, even if not an insuperable one; because the Anglican Church does offer itself to those outside *as a church*, and it is as a church that they are invited to join it. It would not be a church if it were only a kind of federation of beliefs, a label that could be worn without bad conscience by anyone from a Roman Catholic minus Papal infallibility to a Methodist plus bishops. The Anglican church is not, of course, merely this, but it sometimes seems so; and its seeming so is the reason why its great variation of belief is indeed a difficulty.

It is a platitude to contrast the Church of England in this respect with the Church of Rome. It is important, however, what the point of this contrast is. It is not that the Church of Rome presents in all places uniformly the same appearance; it obviously does not. The point is that with the Church of Rome there is in the end a more or less determinate procedure for discovering what are the central and essential beliefs, and what are local variations, and with the Anglican Church there is not—or, at least, there does not seem to be. It may be objected that Rome earns these advantages by the devices of dogmatic pronouncement and excommunication, repugnant to the Anglican position. This may well be true, but it misses the present point. For it is not being suggested that the Church of England should have the same body of essential belief as Rome, or any as elaborate; but only that there should be *some* central body of beliefs common to all. If it is now suggested that devices of excommunication, etc., are necessary to preserve even that minimum uniformity in the Anglican church, the questioner will surely be justified in thinking that the *raison d'être* of the Anglican Church as a distinct entity is hard to find.

It will be said that such a minimum uniformity of belief indeed exists. But it is not always easy to believe this; for while the same *words* can be heard more or less from all, the sense that is attached to these words is certainly various. This is a point I shall come back to. Even if there is a central core, however, it should still be made clearer what is the central core, and what the individual variations. When I say that this should be made clearer, I mean among other things that one should be able to discover this by asking those in orders. Here one touches on another notorious contrast with the Church of Rome, that, very broadly speaking, the average Roman Catholic priest seems to be more thoroughly theologically educated (if I may use the expression) than the average clergyman. This is a very well-known point, which raises questions of the training for the priesthood beyond my scope; I only want to make the point, if it needs making, that this difference undoubtedly affects the status of the Anglican Church in the eyes of the intelligent enquirer.

The point needs making, I think, if only because there seem to be many Anglicans, and some in orders, who find an emphasis on theology irrelevant. These will tend, if questioned about the Church, to point primarily to its social work and moral influence. Now there is no doubt that the Church must show itself socially, and in the broader sense politically, concerned; because—to put the point only in crudely tactical terms—it still undeniably has an unfortunate "class image" to live down. It is no accident that both Roman Catholicism and Nonconformism have such powerful roots among working people. But, obviously, there is no point in this social work without a Christian significance, and there will be no Christian significance without a theology. It is only if behind social and moral action there is a belief, and a belief which to some extent can be explained, that the unbeliever will not be justified in merely replying that he prefers his social work without fancy dress.

This may seem quite platitudinous. I hope it is; I would be more convinced that it was if one did not quite often encounter Anglicans—again, unhappily, some in orders—whose views on the relation between their belief and their social or personal morality were quite inadequate. There are those whose religion turns out just to be their morality, whose religious outlook really can be described as "morality tinged with emotion". Others go beyond this, only to introduce God as the crudest kind of sanction for morality. I have myself been addressed by a R.A.F. chaplain who told us that, after all, one wouldn't steal if somebody were watching, and the thing about God is that he is watching one all the time . . . It was unclear whether this curious consideration was supposed to mean that because God exists, one shouldn't steal, or that because one knows that one shouldn't steal, one can see that God exists. I got the impression that the chaplain didn't mind which he meant.

One would have to be very uncharitable to hold such individual idiocies against the Church as a whole. But they do not help it, and steps should be taken to see that no clergyman goes out to represent the Church without a deeper and sounder moral theology. This merely reverts to the training question. There are at least two points, however, on which I have the impression that the Church as a whole needs deeper thought about its moral theology. One concerns the relation between such things in this life as the improvement of living conditions, and the hope of eternal salvation which is said to be the end of the Christian life. It seems possible that these two should conflict: so far as those whose lot is to be bettered are concerned, it is certainly not self-evident that material betterment will improve their chances of living the kind of life which, we are told, is likely to lead to salvation. Some of the darker reactionaries in such places as the Spanish Roman Church notoriously see this point, and holding that their task is to lead souls to salvation and that

this life is only a drop in eternity, oppose a good deal of social reform. Some Christians dismiss this view too lightly—it has a kind of savage consistency. If they are to reject this view, as all Anglicans presumably will, they must put something in its place. One simple way is to say that it is a known Christian duty to aid others less fortunate than oneself, and in performing this duty, one pursues one's own way to salvation. But put just like that, this sounds too self-regarding, as though one were making others the instruments of one's own salvation. If it is replied that this is a superficial objection, because the duty in question is precisely not to be self-regarding, but to love others as oneself, a difficulty still remains: for the duty is presumably not to love them and aid them merely as temporal human beings with material wants, but as children of God destined, in his Grace, to salvation. The question then remains, whether the right way of expressing love to men in this character is in all cases to work for their social betterment. Nor will it resolve the difficulty to warn the doubter against the presumption of considering the salvation of others, and to urge him to leave that to them and God, and concern himself with his own; for the doubt will remain, whether pursuing these policies of social betterment is the way for him to concern himself with his own salvation.

This is a practical problem, and a deep problem of the relations, for a Christian, of time and eternity. Many Anglicans seem not to have given enough thought to it.

The second point about moral theology is a yet more general one. Unbelievers often say in a truculent tone that the lives of Christians don't seem all that different from the lives of others. This may just be the relatively superficial point that they don't seem to be much better men; about this the Christian has things, sufficiently familiar, to say. But when those things have been said, a deeper point remains. For even if one granted what the Christian has to say of original sin and the ways in which things become harder if one is a Christian rather than easier, there remains the feeling that there should be a distinctively Christian way of thinking about moral problems, what might be called, for want of a better phrase, a Christian style of moral thought. Now there is such a thing; or, rather, there is more than one. There is, on the one side, what has come to be called "the Nonconformist conscience". Admirable though its possessors often are, the doubter in the modern world, corrupted, perhaps, by complexity, knows that he cannot commit himself whole to its simplifications. On the other hand, there is a highly complex style of Roman Catholic moral thought. The heart of this style is casuistry—not in the pejorative sense, but in the strict sense of a method of moral argument that seeks to bring every action and character that is to be decided or judged under certain fixed categories of virtue or good deed, vice or sin. Here again the

doubter must hesitate: surely he *knows* that things cannot be so fixed, that the categories must be open to revision, criticism, extension?

Between is the Church of England. But where? Here, it seems to me, it has both a lack and an opportunity. A lack, because as things are, it scarcely seems to have an individual style of moral thought. Exhortations to the *imitatio Christi* are not, by themselves, enough; up to a point, even the unbeliever can agree to do likewise, and beyond that point, there is need of precisely the kind of moral thinking in essentially Christian terms that is lacking. It has, however, also an opportunity, to find a style of thought more apposite to our complexities than the rigidities, respectively simple and complex, of its neighbours.

Moral theology is, of course, not self-sufficient. Behind it there must be a Christology; and this raises, in the first place, the questions of historicity. Christianity is said by all to be an historical religion, based not only on the facts of Christ's life and crucifixion but on the Resurrection. It is also, I suppose, an historical religion in a rather different sense: it is a religion concerned, like its relatives Judaism and Islam, with its own history, and in particular concerned with the continuity of belief from its beginnings. Now the intelligent unbeliever knows this as well as the Christian does, and will not be impressed by attempts to duck the consequences of it. In particular, he probably recalls that S. Paul said, "If Christ be not risen, then is our faith vain", and will tend very firmly to think that the moment Christians start shuffling on the historical claims for the Resurrection, they might as well shut up shop.

I should not have thought it necessary to say anything so obvious, had I not heard a very distinguished Anglican theologian being questioned closely for about twenty minutes on his belief in the Resurrection, at the end of which it was still not clear whether he thought that as a matter of historical fact Christ rose from the grave or not. There was a good deal of talk about "analogical sense", "surviving spirit"; a theologian might have found in this a sad confusion between the events of Easter Sunday and those of Pentecost, but in brusquer terms, it was just a piece of unconscionable double-talk.

This raises again the question mentioned before, of the unity of belief. This theologian was quite prepared to *say* that Christ rose—the difficulties came when he was asked to say what he meant by it. This is a particularly striking case, of course, because in the case of the Resurrection there is no doubt at all about what the words, in their natural interpretation, do mean. It is not so with many theological doctrines. There are two quite different ways in

which theological assertions may cause difficulty to the enquirer: they may be *incredible*, or they may be *incomprehensible*. The doctrine of the Resurrection, if it presents a difficulty, does so only by being incredible: it is perfectly clear what one is required to believe, only it is not easy to believe it. With such doctrines, if they are certainly part of the faith, it is no part of the theologian's task to try to find a new meaning for the terms that express them. If he does so, he is certainly abandoning the religion. With doctrines such as the Incarnation and the Trinity, the situation is different, for the difficulty of these is their incomprehensibility: it is hard, not so much to believe them, as to take the preliminary step of recognising what has to be believed in order to believe them. It is of course essential that anything that is to be called Christianity contains these doctrines, and contains them moreover in a transcendental form, that is, in such a form that what is being asserted by them is not merely something, however "spiritual", about the temporal life and personality of Christ. I have occasionally seen Anglican clergymen slipping nervously in what looked suspiciously like that direction, though it might be unfair to suppose that there was any such dilutionary tendency in Anglican thought as a whole.

Last one comes to the question of God's existence, and of the arguments that can be given for it. It seems to me essential that there should be some arguments, and it has certainly been the tradition of the Church of England to give some. It is essential that there should be such arguments, not so much to persuade unbelievers—not many can have been converted by purely theological considerations—but in order to give some basis to what otherwise might be an utterly subjective feeling, and also to give content to the belief itself: the nature of the arguments itself gives clues to the nature of the God, the existence of whom they purport to prove. Thus the argument from the first cause illustrates God's nature as Creator, the argument from moral experience his goodness and concern with mankind, etc.

In the matter of such arguments, the Church of England is in a peculiarly difficult historical position. It has been its traditional role, and one of its most English features, to rely on those arguments for God's existence that have most empirical content, which appeal most to the observed nature of the world. Chief among these was the so-called Argument from Design, the argument from the evident purposiveness and fitness of natural things, to the existence of the Great Artificer. Such arguments (as Kant observed) are more satisfying, seem to have more real content, than the more abstract proofs from contingency, the nature of being, and so on, on which the Church of Rome has characteristically most relied. This is true, but there is a corresponding disadvantage. Empirical content is like income: the larger it is, the nicer, but also the more tax it

attracts, the tax in the case of arguments being the likelihood of empirical refutation.

The tax-collector arrived in the form of the theory of evolution by natural selection; and it was because the Church of England was so attached to the Argument from Design that it experienced a convulsion over Darwinism of a sort that Rome (whose own crisis had come over Galileo) largely managed to avoid. Paley's Watch had been the Church's timepiece, and suddenly it stopped.

It is important to see what the difficulty is. It is not that Darwinism disproves the existence of God. The truth of Darwinism is not incompatible with the existence of God, even if it makes his choice of means seem even more mysterious than before. The difficulty for the Church was not that Darwin disproved their conclusion, but that he removed what was apparently the strongest argument they had for it. That argument depended essentially on pointing to something in the world which, it was alleged, could not be explained except on theological principles; Darwin did explain it on non-theological principles (or, to be fairer, his successors are progressively doing so); and this certainly removes the force from the Argument from Design.

The question "is science incompatible with religion?" is now generally seen to be too vague to admit of an answer. What is true is that there are certain arguments for religion, depending essentially on an appeal to the inexplicable, which do collapse under the advance of scientific explanation; and the Church of England seems to show an eery compulsion to embrace just such arguments. This compulsion still continues. Some Anglicans appeal to the emergence of life from the non-living, and so give hostages to bio-chemistry. Others appeal to the start of the universe, and give hostages to cosmology, which may show that there is no necessity to postulate any start to the universe at all. Others—and it is essentially the same sort of argument—appeal to the existence of religious experience, and so put themselves in the hands of psychological advance; for here again, while it would be quite possible to reconcile any psychological explanation of such experience with the existence of God, if we knew on other grounds that God existed, there is a very poor prognosis for a belief in God which is itself mainly based on the psychological inexplicability of those experiences.

Granted all this, there is of course always one question left, which one knows *a priori* could not be answered by any scientific advance: the question, sufficiently broadly taken, of why the universe exists at all. Since all scientific explanation depends essentially on explaining one part of the universe by reference to

another, it cannot in principle explain the existence of the universe as a whole. The trouble is that when the question is taken as broadly as that, its meaning and compulsiveness may seem depressingly to evaporate. We have certainly moved a long way from the impressive workings, to be seen on every side, of Archbishop Paley's Watch.

Here, clearly, the unbeliever can have nothing to say. Since he believes there to be no arguments which will prove this conclusion, he could not, if he dared, suggest where to look for them. But perhaps he may suggest that the Church of England make a more violent effort to detach itself from the *damnosa hereditas* of its addiction to the scientifically refutable, and find something else which will be more solid and enduring, and yet in keeping with its tradition of eschewing the more abstract and rarefied forms of argument in favour of the more familiar and compelling. If it can.

The Paranormal: Neutral, Holy and Malign

MARTIN JARRETT-KERR, C.R.

Wouldn't it be nice, wouldn't it save so much trouble and time, if we had a really good, knock-down, *empirical* argument for religion to brandish at our agnostic friends? But perhaps we have? What about paranormal phenomena (such a respectable, scientific-sounding word)? If we can insert that wedge into their door, may not the draught of the supernatural whistle through the gap? Surely it is worth a try, anyway.

A book appeared in France last year by Mgr. Cristiani* which attempts to demonstrate the existence (and contemporary existence) of the Devil. Not merely of "demonic forces in history": even Prof. Tillich can get as far as that. Nor metaphorically, in the sense in which Prof. Max Gluckman (I think it was) said that, "Freud's *Ego*, *Id* and *Superego* provide a demonology for modern man." But Satan himself, the ever-subtile serpent, and his team.

* Cristiani: *Présence de Satan dans le monde moderne*, (Editions France Empire), 1959.

Mgr. Cristiani, after a brief account of "possession" in the New Testament, gives a rapid sketch of the history of witchcraft in Europe. Because, he says, trials for sorcery were rare in the 14th century, but increased till their culmination in 1530—1580 and in 1580—1620, we can safely attribute "the explosion of demonological literature after 1530, for the most part, to Luther and protestantism". (That Luther led to Satan is a more old-fashioned anti-protestant view than that he led to Hitler.)

He hurries on, however, to the 19th century, and it is here that he becomes interesting. He begins this section with an account of the satanic infestations of the Curé d'Ars, most of which produced well-attested phenomena today associated with poltergeists. This is well-trodden ground. Less familiar is his account of the "visions" which followed upon those of Bernadette at Lourdes : mostly those of children, anxious to be in the swim, seeing "a lady" or "a holy family" in a cave above the grotto. In one case the "vision" followed a little boy back to his village which was in fact jealous of the notoriety of Lourdes and was keen to have its own shrine. These cases were clearly the result of hysteria ; but Cristiani produces evidence to show that they may not have been purely illusory, but could in fact have been the work of Satan who was anxious to bring St. Bernadette's visions into disrepute. (He also implies that Satan had an anti-Catholic bias, and caused these pseudo-visions because he was anxious that mankind should be diverted from stumbling on the truth of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception!) He quotes Baudelaire's remark that "Satan's cleverest trick is to make people believe that he doesn't exist". But this, of course, is a presumption not a demonstration.

From Lourdes we move on to the strange case of Antoine Gay (1790—1871), a simple carpenter who tried his vocation with the trappists but was not accepted owing to a nervous malady. He began to manifest signs of "possession", among them : knowledge of secrets about other people's past lives to which he could have had no access ; violent reaction and frightening behaviour in the presence of sacred objects and formulae ; response to Latin, a language he did not know ; but at the same time, great sanctity of life when not possessed. Several times he was given permission to be exorcised (which he wanted himself), but owing to a series of coincidences he never was. Cristiani suggests that this was providential since through his possession he in fact grew wonderfully in humility, courage and holiness until his death at over 80. And further, when possessed he—or rather, the demon through his mouth—composed striking and thoroughly Roman Catholic prayers and poems to the Virgin. Cristiani implies that if Gay had been exorcised we should have been deprived of some precious Marian devotional literature (composed, oddly enough, by the devil.) Gay was known to the Curé d'Ars, to the Abbé Tocanier, and to that other saintly priest, the Abbé Chevrier, founder of the *Prado* at Lyons.

Next, Cristiani gives us accounts of possessions in widely separated parts of the world : two little boys at Illfurth (Germany) between 1864 and 1869 ; Hélène Poirier in France in 1834 (she died in 1914, at 80, perfectly normal) ; a young African convert girl in Natal (S. Africa) 1906, who was possessed owing to a sacriligious confession she had made, but after exorcism lived a normal and devout life for six years till her early death ; and a whole group of novices at Phat-Diem, in Viet-Nam, 1924-5, who underwent a collective possession, but after exorcism returned to normal, and by 1949, when the story was published, three of the possessed had become superiors at different times, and one a novice mistress.

It is the two accounts that follow, however, that are the most extraordinary in the book. The first is of a woman in Italy who came to a Franciscan priest one evening in 1920 and asked for a blessing. She explained that she had occasional fits, of a disturbing kind, during which she danced, sang arias from operas she didn't know, answered invisible people in unknown languages, and tore things up with her fingers and teeth. The priest happened to be chaplain to a psychiatric hospital and was sceptical : it seemed like an ordinary case of schizophrenia, though more severe than he had ever seen. However, the manifestations became more and more bizarre, and finally he was authorised to perform an exorcism in the presence of her husband, her mother, a friend, two ladies, another priest (who took careful notes) and the medical superintendent of the mental hospital. At the first exorcism the demon revealed his name ("Isabô") and that he had six companions ; also that he had first entered the woman's body on April 23rd, 1913, at 5 p.m. The woman later admitted, under questioning, that a strange spirit had indeed invaded her at that point of time through the medium of a morsel of salted pork upon which a sorcerer had placed a spell. The exorcism occupied several hours, and, since the woman was exhausted, had to be prorogued till later, the demon having promised to do her no harm in the meanwhile. The exorcisms went on from May 21st till June 23rd, thirteen of them. "Isabô" had announced that he would not leave the woman until June 23rd at 5 p.m. Meanwhile the husband was desperate : his wife was tearing up all his clothes, dancing, and threatening their two children (though quiet and normal in between fits). At each exorcism the priest, after reading the *Rituale* (which always resulted in paroxysms of rage in the woman), commanded her to "Reject!"—and she was given a bowl for vomiting. But so far nothing of significance had emerged. However, the reactions of the demon to the *Rituale* grew increasingly feeble, until in the final exorcism he seemed ready to leave the patient. The priest offered to send him into the desert, if he would leave her at once—otherwise he would send him back to hell. The woman threw back her head, and they all heard a male voice saying, in a throttled tone, "I'm going . . ." Then she leaned forward and vomited violently into the bowl. Suddenly, in a voice

that was young, fresh and happy she cried, "I'm cured". The psychiatrist stirred the contents of the bowl, and underneath a mass of stuff, which "fell together like a lovely rainbow-coloured veil", he pulled up a little gobbet of salt-pork, the size of a nut, with seven nodules on it. The woman returned to a perfectly normal, and devout life, with her husband and two children.*

The other case Cristiani gives is contemporary with the writing of his book. A young working-class Frenchman was worried about his wife's health, which was affecting their little girl (aged two). A doctor had recommended three months in a nursing home, but the family were not on a Health Insurance and could not afford it. A friend suggested a certain "Healer and Magnetist" instead, so G. took his wife along to this man, B. B. cut off a snippet of her hair, examined it, and said he could heal her—it was only "nerves". He treated her with some unknown liquid, and she became sleepy. For a time her health seemed to improve. But later it became much worse. She would fall asleep suddenly, especially at meals, but also had an insatiable hunger. G. took her back several times to B., without effect. Then B. said he must treat her by herself. Having got her into a room he ordered her to become his mistress. She resisted, and with difficulty managed to get away. Her condition worsened, and her husband brought an action against B. B. was to be tried for practising illegal medicine, but he persuaded the couple to withdraw their accusation. They did so, but his influence on Mme. G. continued, and B. threatened, as his revenge for their having brought trouble on him, that she would end her life in a lunatic asylum.

Mme. G. got worse, and one evening (August, 1952), suffering from her usual insomnia, she saw in her bedroom an animal with claws, a snake's body, and B.'s head. At this point she and her husband began to return to the practice of religion, which they had abandoned most of their lives, and were finally introduced to a priest who specialised in exorcisms. The treatment began on September 14th, 1953, and was still continuing in 1959 when Mgr. Cristiani completed his book. The first exorcism lasted $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours, and in the course of it the demon who possessed her reluctantly admitted, after enquiry, that he was Satan and had been sent to her by B. He was insulting to the priest and treated the whole thing as a joke, though he resisted violently when a crucifix or holy medal was brought near Mme. G. The séances were so violent at first that they had to be short, for fear the woman should be exhausted. As they proceeded, however, the demon became more malleable. He would even, at command, kneel before the tabernacle and adore God—on one occasion with his (her) head bowed to the ground for half an hour. And he became petulant, whining "I can't come out of her; he (B) won't let me". He would laugh at another priest,

* Mgr. Cristiani quotes from A. Vecchi, *Intervista col disvole* ("Interview with the devil"), Edizioni paoline, Modena, Italy, (n.d.).

D., who had been consulted earlier about the case but had been sceptical about "possession". And he showed that his pride was insulted that he should be at B's command. All this time the prayers of the *Rituale*, to which the demon reacted specifically (that is, recognising individual words), were of course in Latin, a language of which Mme. G. knew nothing.

The exorcisms continued periodically. Before one of them, held in a convent chapel, Mme. G. behaved unusually. Up till then she had been fairly amenable, though inside the church she usually had to be tied to the chair on which she sat, for fear she should harm herself with her contortions and spasms. But this time she resisted being even brought into the chapel, and had to be carried in ; when inside she tried to run away and hide under the pews. It transpired that the day before B. had been vituperating against Mme. and M. G. with unusual violence. And during this session the demon, after much preliminary resistance, became exceedingly querulous and said, "I can't, I tell you" (*sc.* come out of her). "I'll leave her when he (B.) understands. He hasn't understood yet . . . He must be converted before I can go, and I know that'll happen . . . You (*sc.* the Church) must do your best . . . Listen, to convert him you'll have to say rosaries, many rosaries . . . you'll chase me out all right, but it'll take a long time." And the slow process of exorcism is (according to Mgr. Cristiani) still going on today. Meanwhile M. and Mme. G. have regained an almost normal life ; there are long periods between the attacks, and when the crises do come they are less violent and the remedy is at hand.

What is the value of all this ? I think Cristiani does make several points, backed by plenty of evidence which is not presented in a credulous or uncritical way—as my account may have suggested—and which has to be examined seriously. The cases of possession he presents can be clearly distinguished from more commonplace psychotics in the following respects :—

(1) Wherever there are cases of this kind, someone either believed to be, or claiming to be a sorcerer has been active upon the patient.

(2) The patient has, between attacks, a much more normal life than that of most genuine schizoids, even though the active symptoms may be worse.

(3) Psychotics do not react violently to "holy" signs (Latin formulae, holy water, signs of the cross, pious objects, etc.)

(4) Where a cure is obtained by exorcism it seems usually (in the long run) to be complete.

(5) "Possession" appears to present different empirical phenomena from the "Jekyll-and-Hyde", or "Three Faces of Eve", type of multi-personality. The impression here is not that of the merging of the patient's personality into another personality ; rather, the patient seems to provide a passive receptacle for possession, as if he

(she) merely lent his (her) body to someone else, and to someone evil, for the time being.

(6) No doubt the phenomena of telepathy (the patient seems to know facts to which he cannot have had access), and "glossolaly" (the patient speaking in, answering to, languages which he has never learned) can be paralleled from the psychiatrist's case-books; but their occurrence here under the special conditions described could be an effect of demonic possession.

(7) The extraordinary similarity of the phenomena alleged to be the result, direct or indirect, of "sorcery"—a similarity over many centuries and in many different parts of the world, and which could be confirmed independently by innumerable cases in Africa especially—is surely another pointer to the authenticity of the accounts given.

Another book appeared in France, last year also, on the positive, or beneficial side of paranormal phenomena. It is by a Christian doctor-psychologist, a specialist in "psychophysiology" (that is, the realm of extra-sensory perception, psychokinesis, and the *psi*-factor generally), and is a study of aspects of the Curé d'Ars's life.* It is a careful, and cautious examination of such features as his illnesses, his asceticism, his dreams, visions and premonitions, his "cures" and "miracles". Dr. Assailly is careful to point out his own religious presuppositions; but refuses to trespass in the realm which should be reserved to the theologian. At the same time, he shows the inadequacy of any purely reductionist interpretation of these phenomena. His scientific objectivity is shown in the way he selects cases for examination: he rules out a large number that could have had other explanations, were insufficiently attested, or are undemonstrable (for example, "the thirty-six, completely uncontrollable, cases which have to do with the presence of certain souls in heaven, etc.") ; but he is still left with 187 cases of telepathic phenomena of various types. On the Curé's ascetism he observes, after quoting other well-attested examples of fasting, etc., that his survival on a below-minimal diet only confirms "the biological surprises which certain mystics keep in store for us, and the prudence which a doctor must observe when he tries to interpret them". He defends the Curé against the charge (levelled at him by P. Janet and W. James) of masochism: "The Curé said, 'To suffer while loving is to suffer no longer'; and 'To run away from the cross, is, on the other hand, to want to be overwhelmed by it.' . . . So, if the Curé d'Ars had really been a masochist, he would have had to say 'Let us stop loving, so as to suffer more; and let us get rid of the cross, in order to be overwhelmed by it'." Dr. Assailly describes one of the Curé's healings: a little girl who, after being cured before the altar of St. Philomena, cried out "I'm hungry". "We must underline this fact",

* Alain Assailly, *M. Vainney, Curé d'Ars—Médium ou Médiateur* (Les Productions de Paris, 1959).

says Dr. Assailly, "for it has been observed in several miraculous healings at Lourdes [Examples given] . . . It would seem that the protective and reconstructive powers of the organism are, in this case, violently ('brutalement') mobilised, and that the subjects then find themselves in urgent need of recuperation. Some will say that it is only under the emotional stress that they feel famished like this; but our view is that the supplementation of creative power, which is implied in a miracle, uses normal physiological processes though amplifying them." Finally, in distinguishing the Curé's powers from those of spiritualist mediums, and other possessors of paranormal powers, he is careful to point out how extremely shrewd, common-sense, normal, even "earthy" were most of the Curé's judgements. He quotes a M. Dufour, from Belley: "I asked him (M. Vianney) what he thought about a certain lady who seemed to have fits of rage at the sight of a crucifix or of a priest. He replied, 'Oh, it's partly nerves, partly madness, and partly the Devil'."

Well, here is the knock-down, empirical argument. What is it worth? Canon Lindsay Dewar, in a recent, interesting book,* would appear to think that it is worth a good deal. The historical section of his study is a fine attempt to vindicate (a) the doctrine of the "natural" (as well as, and as distinct from, the "supernatural") operations of the Holy Spirit; (b) the giving of the Holy Spirit at Confirmation; and (c) the "communion" (koinonia) of the Holy Spirit in the Church which (as distinct from bible or pope) is the true source of Christian authority. But in the last section he studies doctrine (a) in the context of *psi*-phenomena (the powers of telepathy, etc., which can now be regarded as scientifically proved), and of psychiatric practice. He seems to me to misunderstand Freud at one point (I believe that Freud's account of *superego* formation is probably true, but is not, as Canon Dewar thinks, incompatible with the Christian doctrine of obligation and love). But on the whole it is a useful study of the field, and he is surely right in saying that the resistance to the phenomena of PK and ESP by scientists has been a most unscientific piece of obscurantism. And he rescues some valuable observations, thirty years old now but still relevant, of McDougall concerning the difference between the "crowd" (or temporary aggregation of persons) and the "group"; and relates the distinction to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Church.

But this part of his study leads him to relate psychiatric work to the doctrine of the "natural" operations of the Holy Spirit. He even claims that "the evidence from this field cries aloud for the recognition of the power and working of the Holy Spirit in every man—that is, at what we have called the natural level". It is through the working of the Holy Spirit that the psychiatrist (not, one notes, the psychoanalyst) reveals, through the patient's dreams or through

* Lindsay Dewar: *The Holy Spirit and Modern Thought* (Mowbrays, 1959), 25/–.

free association, the hidden and frustrated tendencies which caused his breakdown. What the psychiatrist is doing is "to give the Holy Spirit the chance which He did not get when the patient was a child". There is even a sort of confirmation of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the psychiatrist's inability to explain how a patient recovers when he does : for the Spirit, in that case, has "blown where He listed". So "the doctrine of the Holy Spirit throws not a little light on the patient-psychiatrist relationship".

Given that the Holy Spirit exists, I think Canon Dewar's interpretation of His work in this realm is most suggestive. And it is important to have stressed again for us the work of the Holy Spirit in all men at the natural level (though Canon Dewar's remark about Karl Barth seeking "to deny reason in order to magnify the reality of inspiration" is simply not true). But if there is, as there seems to be, a suggestion that this realm is a privileged realm—that the field of *psi*-phenomena is somehow a special field which shows the Holy Spirit more active or more detectable than He is in any other—then surely there is something wrong. And if, further, there is (and Canon Dewar does not directly state this) a suggestion that these phenomena somehow prove His existence, then something is more wrong still. Not by counting the pips on concealed playing cards is the Kingdom of God to be established.

What we can surely say—and it is worth saying—is that certain denials may no longer be maintained. In 1884 a certain Dr. Legué said (and it was typical of his day) in a book on Urbain Grandier and the "Possessed" of Loudon :—

> "Science has today shaken off the yoke of theology ; it no longer admits of recourse to diabolical or divine influences . . . For a long time now experts have been studying these strange neuropathic affections, which once passed for supernatural maladies. Thanks to their work, to the impulse which they have given to contemporary research, Satan, the imaginary being, has completely disappeared ; his place incontestably has been taken by scientific reality. Hystericals, like all other sick people, are a matter for medicine, no longer for the priest or the monk-exorcist."*

I do not suppose that kind of confidence would find many echoes today. Indeed, a much more distinguished psychiatrist, Prof. Jean Lhermitte (who died in 1959) wrote an article for *Ecclesia* in 1954, *Les possédés sont-ils fous*?, in which he says :

> "Although the critical and scientific spirit has scattered many mists and destroyed numerous myths, it remains none the less true that in our modern world the number of the demon-possessed is considerable. And I base this affirmation upon a long personal experience."†

* Cit., in Cristiani, from M. de la Bigne de Villeneuve, *Satan dans la Cité* (Paris, n.d.).

† Article in *Ecclesia*, October, 1954 ; Cristiani, op. cit.

If, then, satanic possession shows us the malign paranormal, the gifts of "second sight" that go with sanctity show us the holy paranormal, and significant statistical success in guessing cards shows us the neutral paranormal, what we must conclude from that is simply that that is what they show us. No closed doors are forced open; though I think we may say that doors which have always been open anyway are kept open, and those who would like, through a metaphysical (so-called) scientific prejudice, to close them are prevented from doing so. If Canon Dewar had filled in the biggest gap in his book—he gives us no Eastern Orthodox theologians' teaching on the Holy Spirit—he would, I fancy, have been less confident that the distinction between his "natural" and "supernatural" operations is a valid or useful one. "Supernatural" is not a biblical word (the biblical distinction is between Grace and Nature); and if, as Orthodox writers assert, God designs the ultimate deification of man, then the natural is to be caught up in Him. And perhaps all that the "paranormal" does is to show us, in glimpses, that it has been so caught up already.

Third Thoughts on Convocations

For First and Second Thoughts on Convocations *see* Prism *for March and April 1960.*

Stephan Hopkinson

I had thought, reading a recent article in *Prism* by one of my fellow-Proctors in Convocation, that it was unfairly and unnecessarily offensive. But a recent leaflet, put out by the official authorities and giving a jolly précis of the activities and discussions of the latest sessions of Convocation, convinces me that your contributor leaned over backwards in the direction of charity. This cosy chit-chat, this clerical gossip—are they really relevant to the needs of a despairing world?

Now there are three marks which should be characteristic of the discussions of any central Church Assembly—they should be genuinely representative, they should be relevant, and they should be courageous. Of these, the second is perhaps the most important—but none of the three apply to our Assembly/Convocation activities, which do not really concern the ordinary Churchmember, parson or layman, have almost no relationship, except by coincidence with

the realities of life, and lag behind the most conservative church council in their readiness to take risks.

Now there are a number of reasons for this, and they are perhaps worth consideration.

First, although Convocation and Assembly ask more time than the best and most hardworking of the clergy are prepared to give, their sessions are so widely spaced that their agenda is out of touch with the changing scene and there is no continuity from session to session. Between sessions there is only a skeleton body of civil service calibre to keep the machinery oiled, and pronouncements, if they are to be made at all, emanate from isolated bishops addressing their diocesan conferences or taking part in semi-secular activities.

There is evident need for, first, something in the nature of a "*speech from the throne*" setting out policy and comment upon the actual situations. We had Presidential pronouncements before the recent Convocation session, but these are not programmes or pronouncements so much as pious waffles.

Secondly, could we not have something equivalent to a *Cabinet Ministry*? Even if it consists simply of the Chairmen of Committees, there is clearly a place for some group or standing committee having the right to speak individually on their own subject, or corporately in the name of the Church. An *Information Board* however effective (and this has not always been the case in the past) lacks the weight and influence of a Cabinet of this sort. And Colonel Hornby has yet to show his hand.

Thirdly, there must be much closer liaison between parish and central gathering. At present, the representatives to Assembly and Convocation, once elected, lose all touch with their constituents. In the House of Commons, much of a Member's work is done in the constituency: has anyone heard of Assembly-members being called to account for the way they voted, or discussing with constituents the right action to adopt in an approaching situation? Why should not any ruridecanal conference devote one session a year to hearing what has been—or what will be—discussed in what is, to all intents, the House of Commons of the Church?

Lastly, upon the matter of courage.

It is at once the glory and the shame of our Church that the outspoken denunciations of evident evil, the accurate prophecies of approaching disaster, have been made by the members of it—but so seldom on its general behalf. We have only to study the record of comment upon the South African situation, to see how long ago the true nature of that situation was perceived—but how hesitant we were corporately to listen to our prophets. This same may well be true of nuclear warfare—of prison reform—of education—of traffic casualties. It may be that all the arguments of expediency hold water, and that we must continually be counting the cost, even if as a result we usually decide that it is too heavy a price to pay. But if

there were more frequent open debate upon matters of world interest, if there were opportunity for sound criticism, if we were indeed the mind of the Church (let alone the conscience of the nation), then perhaps we should begin to justify the faith of our forebears of "Life and Liberty".

Kelly of Kelham: Two Essays

Kelly and Kellyism

Gordon Phillips

*No Pious Person** is described as autobiographical collections of Fr. Kelly, the founder of the Society of the Sacred Mission. These scraps have been skilfully edited by Brother George Every of his own community and there is a perceptive introduction by David Paton. There are some admirable illustrations which serve to communicate something of the spirit of this enigmatic figure who will surely take an important place in the history of the Church of England. It was my good fortune to know him a little in the declining years of his life and to learn something of the traditions which grew up around him in the Community and the College which are his permanent memorial. The illustration which meets us opposite the title page of this attractively produced book is the Fr. Kelly I knew myself, and as you read and ponder over his own words, although many of them were written long before the 1930's, you should think of the extraordinary "old man", sitting down in the simple penury of the Gothic mansion which is Kelham, penning out on old envelopes and margarine wrappers with little of facility or grace, the salty, sinewy, wisdom which appears in these pages.

His own first recorded phrase in this selection is a question. "What is cleverness?" he asks. There is something fitting in this, for he was that kind of thinker; one who asks simple and fundamental questions about what all sorts of other people either think is so simple as not to be worth thinking about; or so much written over that there is nothing left to say. The same selection ends (it is describing his move from the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, to Oxford) :

"My father said : 'You must finish', and I did."

* Faith Press, 15s.

This points to another element in his make-up—the concentration on obedience and the will.

> "The covenant of God with man is fitted to his double nature of knowledge and will."

And so we find it on every side of his writings. It is here that I think we must raise our first doubts. For where in all this is *love*? Hopelessly confused we must admit, by sentimentality on the one hand and various forms of enthusiasm on the other, it is yet irremoveable as an element in human life and in the words and works of the redeemer. This emphasis is not accidental; it is specifically admitted.

> "This 'Kelham theology' of the will of God in the world was a Kelham Gospel to the world."

The question we must face is this. If it was necessary to assert this emphasis at the turn of the century, does it not become itself a heresy, a grave disbalance in Christian communication, if it is continually asserted? I do not think I have come across the word "love" more than two or three times in the whole selections. It may be true that the union of intellect and will in oblation to the Lord is, essentially, the act of love; but human beings do have affections, hopes, desires, aspirations, which are an essential part of a human life and still constitute something left over and above in the normal human personality when all that we can call intellect and will has been set on one side.

> "Self-consciousness is the only faculty I possess in a somewhat exceptional degree. Whether it is a natural gift, or whether it is only a result of being so much driven in upon myself, I do not know anyone so continuously aware of exactly what he is doing or wants to do, of his own motives and feelings at any moment."

This is not a bad example of honest self-criticism; but I cannot help feeling that it indicates some serious omission in Christian self-abandonment. It is not fair to suggest that Kelly was a Puritan in the cant sense of the word; but I have some uneasiness about a phrase like:

> "From Oxford onwards I have worked holidays and all other days. The attempt to separate 'work' and enjoyment seems to me the superstition of schoolboys."

Fair enough, if you mean that you should "enjoy your work". But there are some enjoyments which are not work. Indeed it is our "work" to enjoy many of them precisely because they are not "work".

> "When you push your overloaded barrow and stop to rest now and then, try to time the stops so that you can do something useful while you are there—like picking up sticks for kindling," says Fr. Kelly.

I wonder. You might in fact not take the rest you need. You might overload the barrow. You might even end with the obsessive scruple of picking up everything you pass. "In thy law is my *delight*," says the Psalmist.

I think it is just this quality of delight, of joy in the Lord, which I miss from this portrait, though it was not absent from the man and still less from his family. In this Fr. Kelly is a true product of his environment which was a blend of Ulster earnestness, with Evangelical intensity and military idealism.

> "I had a certain dread of 'pietism'. Just as I had learnt to see how easily faith in God might be confused with the acceptance of doctrines, so I had learnt as an Evangelical to see how easily it could be confused with devotional feeling."

It was against this background of extravagant religious feeling, whether in its evangelical form or its more publicised absurdities in the Anglo-Catholic romanticism of the London suburbs in the second half of the last century, that Kelly fashioned, largely for himself and with little to guide him, a way of Catholic life which attempted to be free from the difficulties of both of them. It was the givenness of sacramental order which attracted him, not the sacramental ordinances themselves.

This was all very unfashionable and it meant that for a very long time Kelham stood outside the prevailing fashions of High Anglican life. Indeed when it really entered that mainstream again (largely, I suppose, throughout Fr. Hebert's *Liturgy and Society* and the inspiration that book gave to what are now, in easier times, regarded as theological commonplaces) it was to find that it was preaching to the converted.

> "The attempt to split off fundamental questions as merely philosophical or intellectual, and to regard personal morality, piety 'religion', as the really vital factor, was putting ourselves before God. It involved splitting religion, *pietismus*, off into a sphere of its own for a clique of pious people. The common laity might understand the worship of God; they do not appreciate the worship of 'religion' as a personal state. All that I had first learnt from Kingsley, his broad interest in a nature-world, and in rough people. What I learnt from Maurice of the reality of God, from Catholicism of the reality of worship, from Augustine, of God's will, purposing before all ages that Redemption in Christ for which man was made, was one whole lesson."

This is fine stuff and is a sort of charter to the Christian understanding in the 20th century when the notion of religious principles as to what separates you from your fellow Christians, or from the world, is breaking down. There is however a difficult and unwelcome fact that Fr. Kelly does not ever seem to have faced. It is evaded largely because his actual parochial experience was very limited and

his pastoral encounters were confined very largely to dealing with people with whom he had some point of contact. Yet it is a fact to be reckoned with, that the very common man about whom he was so properly concerned, far from embracing with joy and delight a religious faith which reveals this kind of breadth, intellectual vigour and sturdy integrity, almost always settles for softer options. It has often been remarked upon with some amusement that if Luther could not kill the power of popular Catholicism, the study of the Bible and the return to simplicity in worship, and the use of the vernacular most assuredly will. I wonder whether Fr. Kelly allowed enough for the romantic, affective, imaginative, side of life, and above all of religious life. There seems no record that he ever took much delight in poetry or art or music. He still had the Victorian notion of "useful knowledge" to contend with; though here again his community has risen far above any limitations which might have seemed to confine them to the (dare we call it) consecrated philistinism, of its founder.

The finest thing he ever wrote, a truly prophetic utterance, is the address *Ad Filios*, on the Religious life in Holy Week, 1893. There is another piece of injudicious self-revelation (p. 79 in this volume) where the writer says,

> "I read Piaget's excellent book on *La Compagnie de Jesus, from which I got all my ideas . . .*"

There is no question of the similarity in the two religious ideals of S.J. and S.S.M. as involving above all the sacrifice of the will, and of obedience as the paramount virtue.

> "Both as regards the enjoyment of outward things and individual friendship, it is most important that we should clearly grasp the principle and continually strive to realise and perfect in ourselves, a real control of desires and emotions. I do not think extinction need be insisted [upon], but complete discipline must be laboured after."

Notice here that he actually seems to consider for a moment the notion of *extinction*, in spite of the phrase which expresses a profound truth of life and of faith, when we pray God that He would "put into our minds good desires".

Let us face it. Fr. Kelly is a Protestant clambering up the slopes which lead to the broad plains of Catholic freedom and joy. His writings and his work are a miracle of grace: yet he speaks, not only with the limitations of his own life and times, but with the rather special limitations which derive from English history and culture.

> "I am a soldier, and I speak as a soldier. In two ways an army may be lost; if it breaks up, or if takes refuge in a fortress. Big or little, advancing, standing fast, it is always a power to be reckoned with so long as it holds stubbornly together and keeps the power of moving in the open field."

We might ask what kind of a picture our own church presents at the moment.

I would think that the love of God in Christ constrains us to impose upon ourselves certain positive limitations about exploring other ways of faith and of infinite numbers of possible novelties, and to close our ranks and remain solid on principles which are themselves Godgiven principles which unite, rather than insights which divide and so to be able to keep, what we seem to be in danger of losing, the "power of moving in the open field".

Fearful errors of judgement were made (principally by high Anglicans) in the first forty years of this century. When we set the life and teaching of this great prophet alongside that terrible picture, few of us can doubt who was right. If we have ventured on criticism of some of his honest limitations it is to utter a warning against "Kellyism", a cult which he would deplore as much as his master Maurice deplored Mauricism. God teaches us different things in different ages and the flourishing Society of the Sacred Mission which derives from him as founder, already working in three continents, is likely to be called to another. We may well pray that they, and indeed all all our religious communities, may increase in numbers and in vigour. It is fatally easy for what was the boldest of innovations in one generation to be the hidebound conservatism of another. The religious orders in the Roman Communion are the bold and even wild innovators. It is possible (I hope without losing friends) to ask whether this is honestly the mark of our communities today. The experiments, even the wild experiments, have come from the parish clergy and, *mirabile dictu*, from the bishops.

This admirable book has a fine introduction by David Paton ; but in order that we may all appear to act true to form, I take leave to point out that in it the name of the Society of the Sacred Mission appears *five* times, while that of the Student Christian Movement comes *thirteen* times!

Theological Thinking

George Every, s.s.m.

To a great many people in this country, including most professors and lecturers in the theological schools in the English universities, theology means above all things historical theology, the study of the texts in which the Christian revelation is embedded, and, in addition, studies in the interpretations which have been given of these texts,

and of the revelation in them, by competent authorities, including on the one hand Popes and Councils, and on the other theologians and other students of the Bible. From this point of view philosophy may be needed to understand the terms in which interpretations have been given, and then to translate them into the language of our time, if this can be done. But this is a problem first of historical understanding, and then of communication. The philosophic mind, or any other sort of aptitude for original thinking, is not required of a theologian, and may even be deprecated as a source of dangerous distortions. On the one hand Protestants deplore the Hellenization of Christianity by Greek philosophy, while on the other many Catholics see in speculation the source of heresy.

But to Herbert Hamilton Kelly, the founder of the Society of the Sacred Mission, the centenary of whose birth is this year to be celebrated by that Society and by other friends and admirers of his, theology was first of all a way of thinking about everything. The distinctiveness of the subject, if it could be called a subject, lay in its methods, not its materials. The subject-matter of theology was not religion, or special revelation, but everything seen as revealing the mystery of the divine purpose. This way of seeing is indeed cultivated by reading the Bible and the Fathers, and other writings by later theologians. A great deal of theology in this sense can be found in St. Thomas Aquinas, in Hooker and some other Anglican divines, in the writings of Calvin, and great depth in certain passages of Luther and Wesley, in Newman's sermons, in those of F. D. Maurice and F. W. Robertson, and in our own day in such different writers as Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Louis Bouyer, and Leo Zander, but by and large it is found more often in ascetic theologians or spiritual writers than in systematic theologians or controversialists. For while theology in this sense can be learnt and taught, such learning and teaching can never be abstracted from a whole process of spiritual growth, from the development of insight through the discipline of suffering, through aridity and exaltation, patience and prayer. Heresy in this context is not a condemned opinion, but a disease arising from stubborn determination in holding some one-sided emphasis, some oversimplified explanation of a mystery beyond human understanding, distorting and arresting the development of thought to the injury of souls, and in some times and places of a whole religious tradition. Schism again is not constituted simply by separation from the main body, but by a schismatic attitude which is on the whole the error not of theologians but of moralists, not of Protestants but of Puritans.

Protestantism began with a protest against theological errors that seemed to be, and indeed were, distorting and constricting the whole religious life of Western Europe. That this protest was in great measure justified was admitted at the time, and is now more largely admitted, by the most discerning theologians who remained in communion with Rome. The schism that in consequence divided

Western Christendom did not lie in the protest itself, but partly in the erection of a corrective, justification by faith alone, into a constitutive, regulative principle, an article whereby the Church is said to stand or fall. Thereby faith in God could and often did become faith in faith. But the opposing principle that makes the constitution of the Church turn entirely on communion with the Apostolic See, or communion with bishops in an apostolic succession, has also the seeds of schism, and is moreover less theological than the Protestant principle, which at least recognises the central importance of orthodoxy.

Orthodoxy in English speech and writing generally means conformity with an accepted tradition. Father Kelly held that it ought to mean straight, and therefore balanced, thinking and worship, and that formally correct opinions were no safeguard against the danger of theological distortions. Because theology is a way of thinking, the theological student should first learn something about thinking itself, study the presuppositions underlying his own thought and assumptions, and those of others, and pay a good deal of attention to questions in which his own enthusiasm, zeal, and therefore possible partisanship, are not directly involved. Therefore students at the college at Kelham, which Father Kelly was responsible for founding, spend a good deal of time thinking about psychology and logic, philosophy and history, as well as about the Bible and historical theology, before they are ready to advance, at a rather more mature stage in their spiritual growth, to their first attempts to put their own ideas in order on what may be properly called theological questions, first of all by considering what meaning can be given to the idea of revelation and to theological thinking by men and women who belong, inevitably and naturally, to the world of the twentieth century. This does not mean that theology must be confined within the constricting limits of any single method of philosophical thinking, scholastic or modern. It does mean that it is not sufficient to understand the historical meaning of theological terms, whether in the Bible or the Fathers and the schoolmen, or even to discover a way of translating these terms into others. We have at least to begin to develop our own thinking, the thinking that we engage in whenever and wherever we think about anything, in a theological direction.

In two particulars Father Kelly's own thinking may seem to some extravagantly optimistic. He believed that men with very little education background, and quite ordinary intellectual powers, could be taught to think, and would learn much more by thinking than by striving to remember, without fully assimilating, the thoughts and opinions of authorities. He also believed that modern science was based on presuppositions about the nature of the physical world, and man's vocation to understand and control it, that are in truth rooted in the Christian faith. Therefore while he maintained during the whole of his life a profoundly critical attitude towards the

Idealism that in his day passed for modern philosophy, he never attempted to confine his thinking to the terms of any *philosophia perennis*, whether Platonic or scholastic, but always remained intensely interested in scientific developments, in the philosophy of science as outlined for instance in Mill's discussion of real kinds, and in the psychology for example of William James. He had a good deal to say in his lectures about the subconscious mind before Freud arrived on the English scene. He therefore bequeathed to his brethren at least a capacity to be interested, not only in Freud and Jung but in the philosophical developments that have led to modern empiricism. Some of these took place when he was too old to be directly interested in them, for he was over ninety when he died in 1950. But I believe that he would have rejoiced in the engagement of his children with the questions raised by scientists seeking an empirical approach to the understanding of the Christian faith. Whether a wholly empirical philosophy of faith is possible is indeed another question. It may well be that for our day empiricism and existentialism, each pushed to their furthest points, carry the seeds of opposite heresies. But both have Christian roots in the command to understand and master the natural world, and in the challenge to accept the risk, the leap of faith of which Kierkegaard spoke. And their integration lies in the Catholic faith that when God created the world, He saw that it was good.

On June 16th, Peter Harvey, a youngish, handsome Anglican clergyman, father of six, is launching on his own initiative what he himself calls an extremely expensive gamble, a 72-page bi-monthly glossy, *The Anglican World. Church Illustrated*, also his creation, still circulates 150,000 a month to the more popular readership. But he now says, "Why do we have to go on apologising for Anglicans being middle-class? Let's just face it and give them a middle-class magazine". He is printing 50,000 of the first number and circulating it to practically every clergyman in the Anglican Communion. He has already sold 24 pages of black and white advertising (*Anglican World* has eight pages in colour) at £72 a page. Among his first contributors are the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Bishop Stephen Bayne, who is also acting as editorial adviser. Harvey needs a circulation not far short of 25,000 to pay his way, and thinks he'll get it comfortably—as many in North America as in Britain and as many again scattered round the free world.

Does he sleep at nights? "Off and on", he said.

Sexual Inversion in Modern Literature: Two Viewpoints

I. By a Publisher's Reader

The Archbishop of Canterbury, it is rumoured, is seriously worried about the number of sex plays and films on in London at the moment. He might well be. In the last fifteen years there has been a great increase of licence in the words and scenes permitted by the public not only in plays and films but in novels too. The division between the pornographic and the respectable in fiction used to be well-known and universally accepted but now it is almost lost because many serious novels have taken over the words, scenes and innuendos of pornographic books, leaving pure ponography with nowhere to lay her head. For sex and sadism there is nothing in Mickey Spillane that there isn't in that very okay writer Ian Fleming.

This lowering of standards can be seen particularly in two aspects. In eight years of intensive professional novel-reading I have noticed the optimum age of romantic heroines decline from about twenty-three to seventeen; heroines of fifteen and sixteen are not uncommon; and now there is Lolita, the first, no doubt, of many 11-year-old sex images. The other is the development of an ambiguous attitude to womanhood; straight heterosexuality is rarely sufficient these days, without perfectly recognisable facets of sadomasochism and/or homosexuality; the bosom is no longer the sex symbol *par excellence.*

I believe a more diligent and knowledgeable searcher than I could discern the communication of various fetishist fantasies to readers who feed on these from authors who are able to provide what is needed.

In drama, of course, prostitutes and perverts appear regularly. Isabel Quigly pointed out in a recent *Spectator* (that excellent pro-*Prism* magazine) that two years ago an outcry was raised over an 11-year-old girl playing a part in which she is mildly outraged by an old man of odd habits, whereas now the film is made (*Don't talk to Strangers*) and no comment is made on the matter. This gives some idea of the gathering momentum of the phenomenon, and few would dare to say where it will end up in ten year's time.

Books like *Lolita*, though certainly not obscene in intent, do encourage people to think about the sexual possibilities of young schoolgirls. A few years ago publication of books of this sort in England would have been unthinkable. Many novels nowadays which get respectful reviews in respectable papers without any question derive their sales appeal from the images they conjure up

and the desires they release amongst frustrated and sexually perverted people—people who previously had to make do either with what now would be regarded as romantically anaemic novels or specially written pornography.

Now what will the Church and the Archbishop, as guardian of the nation's morals, do about all this? It is clearly insufficient to condemn it and impossible to stop it. What we have to do, in this as in all other cases is to hate the sin and love the sinner. But a slogan does not solve a problem, and in this case the sin becomes so identified with the sinner that it is impossible to separate them, much less to take up contrary attitudes to the component parts.

What we have to face, in ourselves as in others, is the whole question of the perversion of the sex instinct as a phenomenon both of physiology and of history. We must realise that seriously perverted people (whether repressed or active) are far more numerous than we like to pretend, possibly more than before the war (though one can't be sure of this). After all we are all susceptible to perverse desires at some stages in our lives, as Freudians have known for fifty years. Complete repression is not the only and not necessarily the best solution. Hopeless perverts are still children of God, and such people, some practising, most not, may well be among our friends and neighbours, our employees and employers, our teachers and our pupils, our congregations and our clergy. The apparent debasement of moral standards in current literature may be a symptom not just of declining morals but of widespread and growing sexual unbalance. We must love one another or die, and that means facing the sexual problems, in others or in ourselves, however repulsive they may seem to be, without horror and with compassion. Perverted people are far less likely to achieve happiness than more obviously balanced members of the community: their satisfactions are fleeting, often dangerous, and generally debilitating. Christianity may be their only refuge, and what strength they have. There is nothing in the Gospel to suggest an identification of the Christian with the extrovert, normal, law-abiding citizen (and equally nothing to suggest the contrary). There is everything in the words and actions of our Lord to suggest that a close association between non-sinner (using the word in its narrow sense) and the sinner is of great Christian benefit to both parties.

II. By a Psychiatrist

The increasing number of plays and films which deal with sexual activities and conflicts may be evidence that the long era of humbug about such things is at last drawing to a close.

For one of the striking things about some of these productions is their serious treatment of the matter. About the only thing they have in common with pornography is the subject. The usual

mildly salacious comedy which has no value except as a box-office draw has been with us so long that we take it for granted. Yet it is just this kind of production which shirks the real issues; which, being afraid to stimulate, smugly titillates, and which cannot instruct because it reflects the current ethos which is based on a fear of even looking at sex.

Our system of education leaves most adults completely in the dark about the life of the instincts. Little wonder that sexual problems figure largely in the emotional disturbances which drive people for special help. We know so little about the facts that an exaggerated importance is attached to imaginary codes of ideal behaviour. When an effort is made to find out what is actually going on (for example, the late Dr. Kinsey) there is immediate resistance to what is uncovered. This is hardly surprising for most adults and children believe that there is something dirty and bad about sex. Modern novels and plays often try to explore these dark places in a serious and recognisable way. Some of them are dealing with conflicts and perversions which have people in their grip, and questions of moral responsibility hardly arise. It is strange that sin is usually linked with sexual behaviour, yet for most people that is just the area where they are most influenced by unconscious complexes and act in that unhappy and compulsive way which is characteristic of unconsciously motivated patterns.

In a sense we hardly know enough to say what is a perversion and what is not. Very wide variations of sexual behaviour are observed in nature and it is difficult to attach immediate moral values to one form or another.

In the realm of intellectual endeavour we accept the idea of the infant and child as a developing organism and we go to great pains to teach and instruct in certain matters. Training is needed to bring excretion under conscious control. Similarly the child is taught about eating; what are good and bad foods and how they are to be prepared and assimilated. We regard extremes of behaviour in respect to eating as illness, for we recognise that health in this respect is some kind of harmonious balance between excessive desire for food (bulimia) or complete refusal of it (amorexia). Either state may threaten life itself. Yet when sexual drives begin to manifest themselves they are often greeted with alarm and fear, and repression follows. Often the most drastic threats are used. For example a child caught masturbating may be threatened with "having it cut off", or even with the parent leaving home if the child ever does it again. Needless to say, after a few days of tense abstention, the child does it again, only fearfully and secretly. Similarly when the child or adolescent is searching for objects of sexual desire, there is condemnation of his or her explorations, although they might very well have led to a normal orientation, had not intervention stopped the process.

But many phantasies remain private and unexpressed. In fact

personality development entails a growing distinction between thinking something and doing it. The adult characteristically thinks first and acts afterwards. But children are often in and out of the world of phantasy and sometimes act out their phantasies. To stimulate the sadistic and masochistic elements in the psyche, before the child's ego development can control such feelings is to ask for trouble. For the unhappy repressed adult to discover that others are plagued by similar thoughts and feelings may bring great relief and may open the way for some therapeutic activity. The observation that in modern fiction "the breast is no longer the sex symbol *par excellence*" may be an important example of this. Perhaps as a community we are beginning to grow up, and can dare to look again at the world in which we find ourselves.

Letters

THE AGNOSTICS AND US

Sir,

Evangelism is a nasty word but a Christian duty. Perhaps it is due to the unscrupulous methods that have been and, maybe, still are adopted to "get hold" of outsiders that explains the ill-favour of the word. A deeper objection to the word may be the result of the way in which the Gospel was presented at the official and conventional level throughout the years of the last century and the early years of this. That way centred the Gospel on man and man's sin; the first requirement was a recognition of guilt; evangelists were not infrequently concerned with instilling a sense of guilt as a necessary preliminary to fishing the convert. In so far as the centre of the Gospel, as presented in the New Testament, is the fact of God and God's love, it would not seem an exaggeration to describe that conventional method as a travesty of the Gospel. In my opinion, it certainly was; not the least of the miracles of recent time would seem to be that there are, in view of what has gone before, any Christians in this country at all. God would seem to delight in stupidity, ignorance, even evil in order to bring good out of it.

Yet the fact that evangelism may have been wrongly applied does not relieve the Christian of his duty, in virtue of his baptism, to assist the agnostic to a knowledge and practice of the Faith. Dr. Farrer's first sermon in that spiritual classic of this century, *Said or Sung*, is extremely appropriate here.

What is the task of the Christian when confronted with a non-Christian? It is almost certainly true that argument does no good; it is normally safe to act on the principle that the initiative in any

conversation on the subject of religion should be left every time to the non-Christian. Such opportunities will come in good time; let the Christian be content to do no more at first—and this is probably far more than he realises—than put the non-Christian on his intercession list; leave the rest to God.

And what of those agnostics whose knowledge of religion is confined to its interpretation in terms of guilt? To be recommended to read 1 John would be premature; *Letters of Direction* by the Abbé de Tourville might not be. Few books present so concisely the implications of the Gospel of the love of God, showing itself most frequently in a fallen world in forgiveness. The idea still persists that in order to be loved by God, we must first make ourselves reasonably lovable; in order to be forgiven by Him we must make ourselves tolerably penitent. Perhaps that is the crux of the travesty and we are not quite so far removed from it as we like to think.

Yours sincerely,

CAMBRIDGE. EDWARD A. MAYCOCK.

ISKRA AGAIN

Sir,

May I directly disagree with ISKRA? When he writes, "We need to put a stop to the eternal preoccupations . . . with schemes concerning relations with other Christians", he seems as a man who has not yet understood the first truth of the Ecumenical Movement, that until the Church is visibly one, her proclamation of the Gospel remains distorted. We cannot care for our embryonic members, baptised or confirmed, successfully while our divided denominations deny the reconciling power of Christ and vitiate the strength of fellowship in one body. If I as an Anglican Priest cannot agree about administration with my Presbyterian brother, nor about rules of admission with my Baptist brother, and therefore have to eat eucharistically by myself, what Gospel can I honestly preach to the lost sheep who feels more keenly than I the strain and defeat of living as a fully paid up member of a beastly world?

By all means let there be mass parochial visitation by the Church—when she is herself remade in the image of the Son of God.

Yours faithfully,

ANNANDALE. PETER COLEMAN.

SPENDING MONEY

Dear Sir,

Extensive renovations to famous City churches costing fantastic sums of money arouse in me feelings similar to those expressed by your correspondent who reports on the Dedication of St. Mary-le-Bow.

It may be a case of "sour grapes" as far as I am concerned, but consider my position. I am given a large Victorian pile in the back streets of a working class area—population 10,000. The church is black with grime and shows signs of some decay, there is a dismantled organ, there are drab and shabby furnishings, dirty and threadbare vestments. With only a tiny congregation for a start I have to try and make the Church's worship of Almighty God as attractive as possible if any evangelism is to bear fruit.

£400 War Damage money in the kitty and £650 from the Diocese gives us a fair start towards repairing the organ. The final bill is about £1,400 by which time we have also gone some way to brightening up the inside of the church. Intensive evangelism has built up something of a congregation but they are rapidly becoming conscious of the accumulated debts which begin to worry them as much as does the state of their souls.

Then, nearly five years after we started and with a bank overdraft and a number of unpaid bills, the quinquennial inspection reveals what we had feared—a lot of work to be done on the roof, the brickwork, the stonework, the bell, the gutters, etc.

Estimates come to over £2,000, but as our desire to make our church look as little like a derelict warehouse as possible is as strong as that of the restorers of City churches, we order £3,000 worth of work to be done.

We are promised £1,500 in grants and we launch appeals for the other £1,500.

Then, only five years after it was rebuilt, the organ breaks down and we are told that £1,000 is needed to put it right again. Why? comes the chorus, when you spent so much money on it not so long ago. Because, we repeat over and over again to deaf ears, we were not able to spend enough in the first place.

So here we are, still in the red, and we want £1,500 for repair work, £1,000 for the organ.

Those who sing of Planned Giving and who thunder against "thermometers", Jumble Sales, Football Sweeps and Bazaars might come down here and show us how to do it.

Those who raise fifty times what we want to restore their City churches have, of course, solved the problem. So could we, if only we had a famous peal of bells, the remains of Lord Nelson or something Queen Elizabeth slept in.

But we haven't, and we are only a humble parish church in the back streets among the "unchurched masses" of the working class.

Yours sincerely,

L. KATIN.

BERMONDSEY.

Books

Manifest and Programme

LITURGY AND ARCHITECTURE
by PETER HAMMOND.

Barrie and Rockliff, 37s. 6d.

The barometer whose pale pink line has almost faded away before it climbs to the £2,000 mark necessary for "Church Restoration" and the timbers so dramatically devoured by death-watch beetle making their plaintive appeal to our pockets—this is the face which the Church of England all too often presents to the casual passer-by. Yet there are certainly many new churches. When she does manage to escape from the antiquarian demands to rescue, restore and renovate she builts churches such as those illustrated in those two dispiriting collections *Fifty Modern Churches* (1947) and *Sixty Post-war Churches* (1957). Here you may take your choice between neo-medieval, streamlined traditional or a jazzed-up barn, the exterior frequently what would in a University be derided as "Bursar's Georgian", the interior showing the familiar gilt and Madonna blue beloved of all church-furnishers. Such buildings cannot begin to compare with the recent high achievements in school design, and until three or four years ago there was scarcely a single church in the country which merited inclusion in any survey of imaginative and intelligent British modern architecture. The church here seems to be throwing away a most immediate and obvious way of making its impression upon society. For if churchmen are not concerned to contribute anything to good modern architecture it would be all too easy to conclude that this is because they have nothing relevant to say to contemporary society.

The work of Rudolf Schwarz, Rainer Senn or Fritz Metzger on the other side of the channel, to mention only the most outstanding names, are triumphs of the marriage of theological understanding with architectural achievement. The activities of the *New Churches Research Group* founded in 1958 has started to stir the cosy Anglican slumber. It is to be hoped that the book now published by its secretary will awaken clergy, architects and local P.C.C.'s to the magnitude of their task. This is a manifesto. Mr. Hammond is not afraid to condemn and denounce: even such revered objects as Coventry cathedral (surely at least the Church of England has something *very* satisfactory to show here!) falls under his judgement. He sets out to show that the ultimate causes of the Anglican failure to create a living architecture are theological rather than architectural. The approach to church design has not been sufficiently radical for it has failed to take into account the function of the church in the mid-twentieth century. Instead most of the Churches built during the past thirty years reflect an understanding of the church and its liturgy which is essentially romantic and nostalgic, and fundamentally at variance with present day Christian thought and experience. The best Swiss, German and French churches have succeeded just because they have done this—they are *theologically* informed, they are related to a living theology, they are part of a living tradition rooted in the liturgy and the sacraments.

What that living tradition means in this country is probably best summed up in those two permanently great books *Liturgy and Society* and *The Shape of the Liturgy*. They have brought with them the spread of the parish communion and experiments in the field of liturgy. There is a genuine renewal within the church, an awareness of what it is to *be* the church. At the heart of this lies the eucharist, no longer regarded as a service which focusses individual piety, but a corporate action, in which the laity play their full part, the act of the whole priestly community. Thus, the most simple and obvious reflection of this will be that the altar must not be remote from the holy people of God who are themselves

corpus Christi, the mystical body of Christ. Mr. Hammond castigates the altar pushed far against the East wall, the priest with his back turned upon his people—these are medieval developments, the products of a liturgy which had gradually lost its sense of being a corporate action. We must return again and again to this understanding that the altar holds the central place, as it is central in parish worship and in daily life. From it will stem consideration of the relationship of altar and congregation, font, pulpit, choir and lectern. But it would be ridiculous to deny that the problems do not remain complex. The relationship between nave and sanctuary for example must express at once identity *and* separation. The spatial setting of the eucharist must be such that it draws the people into the action which is taking place while not obscuring the hierarchical structure of differing functions within the community.

This then must be the programme. To its critics who would be horrified at the Church of England so relinquishing its glorious freedom as to tie itself down to anything so definite or coherent as the Directives for church building issued for example by the German Liturgical commission or by the Roman Catholic diocese of Superior, Wisconsin, it must be said that a *retour aux sources* need not be narrowly antiquarian, and that it by no means leads to uniformity. If we turn, as we must, to the Early Fathers, it is in a spirit more pastoral and missionary than archaeological; it is so that we may renew our familiarity with the great truths of their liturgy and church buildings only to make them more completely our own and relevant to the church in the mid-twentieth century. Nor can this be translated into any single ideal solution. Although the circular or octagonal plans are obviously more fruitful than the elongated rectangle, in fact there are countless forms between the two and the same basic truth about the Christian faith may be expressed in extremely diverse plans, the only check being the wholly admirable one that the architect will be unlikely to produce novelty for the sake of novelty or self-glorification when he finds himself bound by the cardinal principle that his building is to be shaped by the worship carried on within it, and not vice versa.

The questions one asks which refer to the parish church and the local congregation are clearly the most relevant and immediate as the parish churches go up throughout the country. But we must not forget that there are other churches, college chapels and cathedrals for example, which fulfil other functions. While rejoicing in all that the liturgical movement has meant in the resurrection of church life, and the rediscovery of the place of the laity, we should be beware of falling into the trap of oversimplifying the problems and shouting as triumphant solutions a succession of catch phrases and glib slogans. Some time ago a contributor to *Theology* was daring enough to suggest that some people even received spiritual help from Evensong. We must guard against losing a precious element in our Anglican tradition of worship simply because it forms no part of the Roman Catholic liturgical movement. And above all we must beware of doing violence to the living faith and worship of Christians, even if they appear to us distorted. We must never be tempted to assume in our arrogance that we are not still in the dark. The liturgical movement is by no means thought out. The liturgy is still often an artefact. Why is the Parish Communion a success for example? Very often more for natural than supernatural reasons: the more convenient time of day. Or again, as far as the offertory procession is concerned, it is very natural for a prosperous society to underline the goodness of its material wealth by making some token offering of itself. It often does not yet bear the significance for the people which the theological experts and academic reformers like to think.

In his necessary and understandable emphasis on "Programme", on the architect's knowing what churches are for, Mr. Hammond skates rather lightly over the main problem of all modern art, architecture included. In past ages an artist, however skilled and conscious of his methods, assumed a whole structure of symbolism relevant to all his contemporaries; his inspiration was spontaneous. Our art is critical and conscious rather than spontaneous. Whereas it is inconceivable that a

Romanesque church could have been built in the fifteenth century, today we can happily build in *any* form. We have no structure of symbols universally and consciously accepted. "Functional analysis" is one attempt to solve this dilemma, but the fact that once stated its principles are self-evident and have produced notable successes, for example in English school building since the war, must not blind us to the fact that there is more to good architecture than this. Mr. Hammond admits this, and proposes the tentative beginning of a solution in advocating in architecture a conscious stripping to essential structure, the avoidance of all decoration. More than this is needed however, and architects and theologians will have to ponder more deeply the meditations of a Rudolf Schwarz on the meaning of forms (it is a great loss that his *The Church Incarnate* is not available in this country) and the implications of building for the bodies of men. Perret's new church of St. Joseph in Le Havre for example, though exciting, singularly fails to conform to human dimensions, it is a church for supermen, for a "brave new world", not for the families, the black-shawled old women, the children, that make up the living temple of the Body of Christ. Architecture has to learn the theological lesson that Christ assumed and redeemed the form of man. A church with "all the right things" will be a failure if this should ever be forgotten.

ESTHER MOIR

Self-Examination and Scrupulosity

THE PLAIN MAN LOOKS AT HIMSELF by WILLIAM PURCELL.
Collins, 12s. 6d.

This book is ostensibly about self-examination, actually about the graces of the Christian life. Mr. Purcell believes that the measure of our *transgression*, of our falling short of the glory of God should be a developed sense of what grace, unresisted, can work in the Christian soul and, like others in this field, he chooses as the basis of self-examination St. Paul's account of the gifts of the Spirit.

I do not, ordinarily, care for this type of book. They are apt to be self-consciously lyrical about grace, and not plain enough about sin. Mr. Purcell escapes the lyricism, and has indeed written a sensible book which can be read without embarrassment; and this for a surprising and delightful reason. He realises, as far too few churchpeople ever realise, that novelists and dramatists usually know more about the workings of human personality than preachers and moral theologians. The beautiful contrast which he draws, for instance, between a revivalist hymn and the account of Nekhlyudov's repentance in Tolstoy's *Resurrection* is not the kind of thing we expect in "spiritual books", but it is entirely apposite in a discussion of the gift of joy. What in fact Mr. Purcell forces us to realise is the poverty of our *imagination* of religion. What is more, all his chapters are followed by quotations from religious and secular writers which are selected to deepen our realisation both of the grace which he has been discussing and of its opposite sins. I could have done with a greater number of quotations from secular writers—why not Jane Austen, or George Eliot?—and fewer devotional bits, but this is a small fault. Mr. Purcell's method, and his selected passages give the book considerable advantages over others of its kind: it is more interesting to read, and it gives more to the reader, for it enriches his imagination of the moral life. And this is deliberate, for I take it to be Mr. Purcell's intention to present Christian virtue as a *condition of being* no less than as a correctness of doing.

But this draws him into a difficulty about self-examination. As he himself says, "sins are acts". The question which we ask ourselves before we go to Confession is or should be *How have I disobeyed God?* If we have good confessors we shall find ourselves in hot water if we confess to psychological states for which we are not wilfully responsible. Not to be at peace with oneself, not to be joyful is not in itself a sin, for the gifts of the Spirit are precisely *gifts:* it is legitimate to pray for them, to prepare oneself for them, but

we are certainly not to blame ourselves for not having them. And I can imagine that if Mr. Purcell's book were used primarily as a manual for self-examination it might lead to scrupulosity. Penitents anxiously enquiring of themselves whether they have been full of *holy joy* are not unknown in the Church, and are, I understand, a great problem to their confessors. And it does make me a little anxious that so many of Mr. Purcell's admirable questions are directed to the penitent's *state* in himself and so few, except after the chapter on Kindness, to his social acts.

Let us put this issue in practical terms. Meekness is not one of my virtues, and I find Mr. Purcell's questions on that virtue extraordinarily acute, yet none of them are of any real value when it comes to asking the question *How have I sinned?* To ask a man if he is bothered by questions of rank and precedence is to ask him about his temptations, not about his sins, or, more precisely perhaps, to ask him about the training and experience which has so formed his mind that he is subject to certain temptations. Again, whose opinion matters most to you is an uncomfortable question, but what I really want to know is about the acts which flow from the exquisite folly of caring for no one's views but my own. What I say to my confessor is not *I have not considered other people's opinion of me,* but *I have been rude to Blank because I despised him* (this case is hypothetical). In short, I think that Mr. Purcell's book is liable to be valuable in a different way from that of most books on self-examination. The contemplation of Christian virtue to which he invites us will not help us to exact confession; what it will do is to stimulate and encourage penitence and humility in those who read it with an open heart.

VALERIE PITT

APPROACHES TO CHRISTIAN UNITY by C. J. DUMONT, O.P. *Trans.* HENRY ST. JOHN, O.P.

Darton, Longman & Todd, 25s. 0d.

Père Dumont is well known to many in this country as the Director of *Centre Istina* in Paris. The word is Russian for *Veritas,* the Dominican motto. Père Dumont's work is concerned with the promotion of every aspect of study of the Eastern Churches. But he does not stop there; he is a true ecumenist, and as such he has many Anglican friends.

The reader of this collection of short essays can hardly fail to be impressed in the first place by the author's capacity for *suffering* on behalf of Christian Unity. Just as a model ecumenist should be, he is deeply and costingly involved in the agony of division among Christians, and at the same time rock-like in his adherence to the tenets of his own communion. If we close his book depressed and sad, that is in the nature of the case what must be expected.

Perhaps these forty-four articles should not have been bound together in a book. The cumulative effect of an oft-reiterated presentation of:

> "the fullness of the Una Sancta which is incarnated in the Roman Church" (p. 137)

is somewhat chilling to the also ecumenical outsider. Père Dumont may and does suffer to an extent far beyond the capacity of most of us. But in the end:

> "it is the teaching of the Church that the unity to which we are reaching out cannot be of a different nature from that which is made effectively real in and by the whole body of Christians in communion with the successor of St. Peter." (pp. 192*f.*).

Of course he must say that; we should hardly know where we were if he didn't. And yet . . . well, that is just where the pain comes. *Istina* means Truth, and every man must be faithful to the Truth as he sees it.

This collection will be best appreciated if it is constantly realised as being addressed primarily to Catholics of the Roman obedience. No doubt is left on that score in the notable Introduction by the translator, who is now Provincial of the English Dominicans. Bearing in mind that the average Roman Catholic is very far from well instructed in an ecumenical outlook, it is good to find Père Dumont reminding them that:

> "we should never let ourselves forget that their [*sc.* non-catholics'] difficulties are also before all else a cause of suffering to them" (p. 92).

Here, we feel, is one who deeply "understands".

> "The Christian mystery . . . at its deepest and most essential is the mystery of unity" (p. 29).

For unity therefore above all we must pray. The first fifteen essays are in effect a series of admirable liturgical sermons. As the book goes on, the author moves from prayer to doctrine, ending, as he must, with charity. For the unity of all Christian people can only be brought about by God in response to a fearless pursuit of doctrinal truth (*Istina—Veritas*), going hand in hand with charity and prayer.

MARK TWEEDY, C.R.

KENNETH KIRK by ERIC KEMP.
Hodder & Stoughton, 20s. 0d.

Being a Bishop's son is, I suppose, no worse than being the son of anybody else, except that, as a boy, one is expected to be either a good deal better or a good deal worse than the others. Either the child from an episcopal home must himself be steeped in holiness; or, the principle—usually a pretty sound one—that the clergyman's son is always bad, led people to believe that *a fortiori* a Bishop's son must be the worst. Normality was the one thing that no-one expected.

It may have been worse in our case, of course, through the absence of a mother. Canon Kemp, in his excellent Life of my father, Kenneth Kirk, has rightly underlined the nature of the tragedy which struck us when my mother died at the age of 44. That something of my father died with her, I have never doubted, for his devotion to her was deep and beautiful. We were not aware of the effect on him at the time, of course; my eldest sister was eleven at the time, I was six, and my young brother barely a year old. To be left suddenly with five children on his hands at a time when his career was obviously approaching its turning-point was by no means an easy situation, even for a man of such a powerful mind and great organising ability as he. Furthermore, so far as I was concerned at any rate, though at his happiest with children, there seemed to be a curious block which prevented him from understanding the natural unhappiness of the adolescent. My adolescence coincided, as it happened, first with his very serious illness and subsequently with the War, with the result that we never really came together at all until he had been a Bishop ten years. It was the last seven years of his life that I knew best, when there was nothing he liked more than to discuss with his children the way their careers were going. Although he never told us, I have discovered from many people since his death that he never had the slightest doubt that any child of his would do well; he died the year before I was elected to Parliament, at a time when there hardly seemed to be a chance that I could win. He, however, had no doubt about it; as a son of his, I could not lose.

This absolutely certainty of mind which he achieved in many matters was taken by many for arrogance. In fact, he was in many ways, a curiously humble man, and certainly a very lonely one. I think his only close friend at the end of his life was Gregory Dix, and the latter's death was almost as great a blow to him as my mother's. Constant ill-health made him irritable, not least with his children, and the somewhat formal nature of our home life could be a little putting-off.

We lived in an enormous house on Boars Hill; there was nothing of the Cathedral Close about it, and the garden was a perfect place for children, but my main memory of it is the endless games of Bezique which we played in the evenings, usually just the two of us, not talking very much, he himself absorbed in the game and absolutely determined to win. He usually did; he had a much better sense of the game than I. I much preferred Bridge, which he could play well, but even when there was a four there, he would never play it. I think he did not like the thought of being dependent to some extent on a partner.

As a worker, of course, he was unsurpassed. Even on his annual holidays, he would stay at a little village in

Derbyshire, and there he would humbly carry out quite a number of the duties of the parish priest, who would carefully arrange to be on holiday when he knew the bishop was coming to stay. He was perfectly contented to do this; for one thing, it reminded him of his childhood in those beloved Dales, and for another it was a throw-back to the days when his wife was alive, and the whole family would set off in a bus to some country rectory, where he would take a locum's job for several weeks. These holidays stopped when he became a bishop, but his remarkable pastoral gifts—the finest side of his character, I think, although it is as a theologian and administrator that he is chiefly remembered—could still be refreshed for a short time by the life of a parish priest which he had never known. (It is interesting to reflect that, at a time when the cry is always for bishops with parochial experience, my father, who had less than two years as a curate at the beginning of his Ministry, and never held a living in his life, was possibly the most pastoral bishop on the Bench.

The other side of him which I loved to share was his love for the theatre. He might have been a great actor, and certainly he had leanings that way when he first came down from Oxford. I remember, after I had moved to London going with him to see *The Little Hut*, a play with a great reputation for naughtiness, but extremely funny. I thought it would appeal to him, and it did, but he enjoyed even more spotting all his colleagues in Convocation, which was sitting at the time, disguised as laymen in the audience. He himself was in the proper bishop's dress, and he got great amusement out of greeting startled archdeacons and deans who had hoped to be unnoticed. He was no Puritan, but rigid in his standards; wit he loved, dirtiness appalled him.

Life with Father was not, of course, the only, or indeed, the main factor involved in being a bishop's son. Life with other people, particularly at school played a much bigger part. The nickname, inevitable I suppose in this case, came easily off the tongue; I was known as "Bish". Discovery that my father wrote books led to much jocularity, even though even the titles were incomprehensible to nearly all of my school-friends—and, indeed, to myself. The worst ordeal was, of course, when he came to preach. The fear that he might in some way make a fool, not of himself, for he would never do that, but of me, lingered on until the moment he left the pulpit. With his unerring instinct, he had seen the danger, and given the wags absolutely nothing which they could fasten onto at all—no catch-phrase which would ring round the school for weeks afterwards, no gesture so easy to imitate, no unfortunate trick of pronunciation. As a result, not only my stock, but the stock of bishops in general went up sharply; hitherto, almost the only one of the breed we knew at all had been a distinguished Old Boy, Bishop Winnington-Ingram, then well into his eighties, who never preached for less than 35 minutes, all of it inaudible.

Oxford was a good deal better. There, being the son of the local bishop was a positive advantage, and in my college, where he had been chaplain for twelve years, I had known all the dons since I was a small boy. My father would always come to talk to any of the societies I was interested in—I even got him to address the Conservative Association once, though his politics, if any, were right-wing Liberal.

Somewhere about then, I had to decide whether to take orders or not. Naturally, if I had heard a call strong enough to compel me, I would have done, but I never did. And all the other factors seemed to me to be against it. I think I believed sufficiently to be a clergyman—indeed, probably as much as most of them do—but I had a strong and thoroughly worldly prejudice against following the career of someone who had done so well in it. I know that his dearest wish was that one of his sons should follow him into the Ministry, and we neither of us did, but never once did he urge me to do it. He left me completely alone to make the decision by myself, and when it was made, he accepted it with enthusiasm. With his family, as with his flock, there was never any trace of "Father knows best"; provided he knew that the decision had been taken in the right way, that was good enough for him.

PETER KIRK, M.P.

William Temple Association

SUMMER CONFERENCE 1960

A one-day Conference on **"AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH"** is to be held on **Saturday, 25th June,** at the **Waldegrave Hall, Duke Street, London, W.1.,** from 11 a.m. to 6 p.m. Speakers will include the Rt. Rev. B. F. Simpson (formerly of Southwark) and the Rev. F. P. Coleman (General Secretary of the Church Union).

Cost (including buffet lunch and tea) 10/-.

Full details from:
DEREK PATTINSON, 1 MANCHESTER SQUARE, LONDON, W.1
Telephone (evenings): WELbeck 1815.

London Branch Meetings—May and June

The Association's London Branch is continuing its series of Meetings on **'Law and Morals'.** On 31st May, the Rev. G. R. Dunstan will speak on **'Suicide'** and on 14th June Mr. A. W. Peterson (Chairman of the Prison Commissioners) will speak on **'The Penal Treatment of Offenders'.** Both Meetings at Liddon House at 8 p.m.

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